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A

CONCISE HISTORY OF CORPORATE MERGERS

AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
C. Paul Rogers III*
American merger control law today is governed primarily by regulators
and not courts,focusing on consumer welfare and efficiency. This was not
always the case though, and the author traces the development of this areaof
law from its nascent beginnings with the Sherman Act to the era of private
enforcement witnessed today. As the Indian economy continues to expand,
mergers and acquisitionshave becomefrequent bringingwith them difficult
questions of anti-competitivebehaviour.A study of the American experience,
it is argued,would provide valuable insight in enforcing the ratheruntested
anti-mergerprovisions in the CompetitionAct of India.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As India embarks on earnest enforcement of Section 6, the anti-merger
provision contained in its competition law, a look at the history of merger law in the
United States may prove instructive and help avoid the pitfalls and missteps that
plagued U.S. enforcement efforts. The U.S., of course, enacted the first competition
law in 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Act and thus, as the forerunner, was
Professor of Law and former Dean, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University, Dallas, Texas, USA. Of Counsel, Locke Lord, Dallas, Texas. The author
thanks Prof. Julie Patterson Forrester for editorial comments and Greg Ivy for research
assistance. Errors are the responsibility of the author.
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in the position of having to make it up as it went along. In other words, the United
States did not have other developed legal systems to look to when fashioning its
own competition law policy.
I am not presuming to assert that late 1 9 th century America mirrors 21st
century India, but I do believe there may be some similarities. For example,
through an Industrial Revolution following the Civil War which ended in 1865,
the United States was transforming itself from a largely agrarian society to a
more urban, industrial and business-based economy. One result was that for the
first time, companies and individuals came to acquire, by hook or by crook, large
accumulations of economic power and wealth.
In large part, those acquiring economic power formed so-called trusts, a series of
interlocking companies which, while perhaps giving the appearance of competition,
were in fact monopolies or near monopolies. The first of these originated in 1879 with
the initial Standard Oil Trust, which would eventually give Standard Oil virtually a
complete monopoly over the production, distribution and sale of oil products in the
U.S. The trusts were in fact mere cartels in form and resulted in loose agreements
among firms on price and output. Since the Sherman Act, passed by the United
States Congress in 1890, was passed in large measure to battle the trusts, American
competition law became known as antitrustlaw, and the name has stuck.'
Sometimes, in oligopolistic markets where few firms, while competing,
collectively controlled a market, the competitors find it to their mutual advantage
to merge. However, the initial attempt to apply the Sherman Act to consolidations
was unavailing. 2As a result of that decision and the perception that the Sherman Act
was aimed primarily at cartels, an unprecedented wave of industrial consolidations
took place from 1895 to 1904. Indeed, between 1897 and 1904, 4,227 firms merged
into 257 consolidated enterprises. By 1904, it is estimated that 318 "trusts" controlled
two-fifths of U.S. manufacturing assets.3
1

For histories of the Sherman Act, see. e.g., RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY
IN AMERICA, 1888-1992 (1996); HANS THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION

(1955);

2

3

H.
(1910).

ALBERT

SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN

WALKER, HISTORY OF THE

United States v. E.C. Knight & Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) [Supreme Court of the United
States United] (the defendant refined and manufactured 65% of U.S. sugar and had
acquired four smaller, independent manufacturers, all in the Philadelphia area, which
gave it over 90% of the market. The Supreme Court held that manufacturing was not
"commerce" and thus the Sherman Act did not apply.)
See Jesse W. Markham, Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers, in BUSINESS
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 157 (1955); Ralph L. Nelson, MERGER MOVEMENTS
IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY

1895-1956 (1959).
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This period of rapid consolidation was finally brought to an end in 1904 with
the government's successful prosecution in the Northern Securities case.4 The case
aroused great public interest, fueled by the "trust busting" rhetoric of Theodore
"Teddy" Roosevelt, who was in the midst of a rousing election campaign for the
1904 presidency. It is remembered as the first successful antitrust prosecution of
a large industrial combination.
While the Northern Securities decision did much to dispel concerns that the
Sherman Act could not reach large corporate consolidations, two subsequent
consolidation cases were lost, casting doubt on its overall efficacy.6 In 1911, however,
the United States won three pivotal decisions against Standard Oil, American
Tobacco, and Du Pont, all of which involved enormous industrial consolidations.7

4

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) [Supreme Court of the
United States] [Hereinafter, "Northern Securities"]. The Northern Securities Company
was a holding company formed by competing railroads. The holding company was
formed after a series of vicious business battles fought by the renowned American
industrialists J.P. Morgan, James J. Hill, and E.H. Harriman. These three men controlled
the Northern Pacific, Great Northern and Union Pacific Railways respectively. Rather
than continue in competition with one another, Morgan, Hill and Harriman created
a holding company to reduce competition and facilitate connecting long distance
routes through St. Paul, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, Denver and other
important cities from the Eastern United States to the rapidly disappearing frontier
in the west. The Supreme Court struck down the consolidation in a 5-4 decision, over
a strong dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See generally William Letwin, LAW
AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA

182-237 (1965) (describing Northern Securities as the

"coming of age of the Sherman Act").

5

Although the "trust busting" label is normally applied to Theodore Roosevelt, it is
his successor in the Presidency, William Howard Taft, who most deserves the label.
During his four years in office (1908-12) Taft continued the case against Standard Oil
that Roosevelt had begun in 1906 and brought monopolization suits against a plethora
of leading American companies, including American Can, American Tobacco, Corn
Products Refining, Du Pont, Eastman Kodak, International Harvester, United Shoe
Machinery, U.S. Steel, and many leading railroads. See James C. German, The Taft

Administrationand the Sherman Antitrust Act, 54 MID-AMERICAN 172 (1972).
6

See Cincinnati Packer Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179 (1906) [United States Supreme Court];
United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913) [Supreme Court of the United States]. See
also C. PAUL ROGERS III, STEPHEN CALKINS, MARK R. PATTERSON & WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN,
ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 502-08 (4TH ED., 2008); STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES
OF ANTITRUST 320-24 (1993).

7

See Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) [United States Supreme Court];
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) [United States Supreme
Court]; United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) [United
States Supreme Court]. See also United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 226 U.S.
61 (1912) [United States Supreme Court].
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The American Tobacco case is emblematic. The American Tobacco Company,
created in 1890, was a conglomeration of five "fiercely" competing companies which
merged into one. After consolidation, the company controlled some 95% of the
cigarette market, and 8% of the smoking tobacco market. Shortly after the merger,
the company initiated severe price wars, and then purchased their bankrupted
competitors. Perhaps the most egregious anticompetitive conduct occurred when
the American Tobacco Company purchased 40 viable competitors and immediately
shut them down after forcing the managers of the acquired companies to agree
not to compete for ten to twenty years.
Although the Supreme Court found that both the American Tobacco Company
and the Standard Oil Company's activities violated Sections I and 2 of the Sherman
Act, its adoption of the "rule of reason" standard caused widespread political
concern that the Sherman Act had been compromised and would thereby permit
companies to merge and become dominant in the market so long as they did not
use anticompetitive tactics. Indeed, each of the three 1912 presidential candidates,
William Howard Taft, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, ran on platforms
promising legislation to strengthen the antitrust laws.' After Wilson's election,
Congress in 1914 passed the Clayton Act (as well as the Federal Trade Commission
Act), which included Section 7, an anti-merger provision that was intended to reach
consolidations leading to monopoly.9

II.

THE CLAYTON ACT:

1914 TO 1950

The Justice Department and newly created Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
were granted jurisdiction over the Clayton Act, thus, it was hoped, doubling the
government's enforcement authority. Early enforcement efforts were vigorous,
particularly by the FTC, and, under Section 7, appeared to have halted the formation
of holding companies, which had succeeded the trusts of the late 19 t h century.'

8

See, e.g.,

DAVID DALE MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT

GELLHORN, WILLIAM

IN A NUTSHELL 33 (5th

9

10

E.

20-43 (1959);

ERNEST

KovAcIc, & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS

ed., 2004); A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 178-80
(2d ed., 1970).
The original version of §7 read: "That no corporationengaged in commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share of capital of another
corporationengagedalso in commerce where the effect of such acquisitionmay be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition,or to restrainsuch commerce in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.....
See, e.g., David Dale Martin, supra note 8.
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A significant flaw with the original version of Section 7, however, was that it
applied only to acquisitions of stock of other companies, thus failing to reach asset
acquisitions or other "statutory mergers" not technically involving purchases of
stock." Corporate America took full advantage of the Congressional oversight,
and it can be argued that the omission facilitated the merger wave of the 1920s.
In addition, the earlier Congressional fears about the inability of the Sherman
Act to curtail large industrial combinations under the rule of reason were realized in
several Supreme Court decisions in the 1920's.12 In the U.S. Steel case the defendant
was a holding company organized in 1901 to consolidate approximately 180
previously independent competitors. The combined firms controlled 80% to 90%
of the country's iron and steel production at the time of the consolidation, but had
about 50% of the market when the government brought suit in 1911. The Supreme
Court, in a 4 to 3 decision, ruled that the defendant had not violated the rule of
reason. The Court found that the defendant had "resorted to none of the brutalities
or tyrannies [of] other combinations," reducing the government's argument to one
in which "the size of the corporationand the power it may have, not the exertion of that
power, is an abhorrence to the law."'13 The Court then held that size alone, without
overt acts, was not an offense under the Sherman Act. 4 In contrast, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act was intended to be preventative in nature and forbids mergers
where there is a "substantial likelihood" of decreased competition without the
requirement of overt acts other than that of combining or merging.
The Great Depression of the 1930s stilled merger activity; however, the postwar resurgence of the economy brought abo ut an increase in merger activity and,
concomitantly, a resurgence of the discontent about the limitations of Section 7.
Fully sixteen bills to amend Section 7 were introduced in Congress between 1943
and 1949 and Congress held public hearings on proposed amendments in three
separate sessions. 5
11
12

13
14
15

Supra note 7. See also Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926) [Supreme Court of
the United States].
See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) [Supreme Court of the United
States]; United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927) [Supreme
Court of the United States]; United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922)
[Supreme Court of the United States]; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920)
[Supreme Court of the United States]; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251
U.S. 417 (1920) [Supreme Court of the United States] [Hereinafter, "U.S. Steel"].
U.S. Steel, at 450.
Id. at 450-51.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962) [Supreme Court of the
United States] [Hereinafter, "Brown Shoe"] for a full legislative history.
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Then, in the leading case of the decade, United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 6
the Supreme Court by a 5-4 margin ruled that an asset acquisition by the nation's
largest steel producer of the second largest steel fabricator in the western portion
of the country in a concentrated market did not violate Sections 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act. There Columbia Steel, the wholly owned subsidiary of U.S. Steel,
had purchased the assets of Consolidated Steel. U.S. Steel controlled 13% of the
western market, while Consolidated Steel held 110%of the same market. The Court
held that the relevant market was the national market for steel, and that even if the
market were more narrowly defined, the companies would have been unable to
maintain their current market shares given the current market conditions. 7 In so
holding, the Court approved an increase in the level of concentration of an already
highly concentrated industry, which effectively foreclosed significant actual and
potential competition."
The decision drew a strong dissent by Justice Douglas who famously penned
"[w]e have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have been burned into our
memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows how size can become a menace - both
industrialand social. It can be an industrialmenace because it creates gross inequalitiesagainst
existing andputative competitors.It can be a social menace- because of its control of prices...".19
Spurred by that dissent and wide discord about the Columbia Steel outcome
as well as a 1948 Federal Trade Commission study on the undesirable effects of
mergers, 20 Congress at long last acted to plug the loopholes that had so emasculated
the original Section 7, passing the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950.21 That act expanded
Section 7 to include asset as well as stock acquisitions and expanded coverage to
22
include vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal mergers.

16
17
18

19
20

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) [Supreme Court of the United
States] [Hereinafter, "Columbia Steel Co."].
Id. at 528-30.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 591 (1976).
Columbia Steel Co., 535-36. See also, C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice
William 0. Douglas, 56 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW 895, 924-26 (2008).
See Federal Trade Commission, The Present Trend of CorporateMergers and Acquisitions,
reprinted in HEARINGS ON H.R. 515,300-317 (1950). See also Federal Trade Commission,
THE MERGER MOVEMENT:

21
22

A SUMMARY

REPORT

(1948).

Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, Pub.L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) [Current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2006)].
The Supreme Court, however, did not confirm that §7 applied to vertical mergers until
1957. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) [Supreme
Court of the United States].

Vol. 24(2)

ITT.

National Law School of India Review

THE REVISED SECTION

7

2013

AND THE WARREN COURT

With the revised Section 7, an aggressive Department of Justice, and a hawkish
Supreme Court, the late 1950's and the 1960's brought about an unprecedented
expansion of successful merger enforcement actions. Indeed, Justice Potter Stewart,
a frequent dissenter in antitrust cases in those years, famously wrote in response
to one particularly egregious merger decision, "[tihe sole consistency that I canfind
23
is in litigationunder Section 7, the Government always wins."
The 1962 Brown Shoe decision 24 was the first to reach the Supreme Court
under the amended Section 7 and turned out to be particularly controversial.
There the Supreme Court condemned the acquisition of the eighth-largest seller
of shoes by the third-largest shoe seller. The Court examined the market shares of
the participants, the level of concentration in the industry, the acquisition history
of both companies, and then focused on a perceived trend toward concentration in
the industry. With respect to the requisite market share, the Court noted that in 47
cities the combined market share of the merged firms would exceed 5% in men's,
women's and children's shoes.25 In striking down the acquisition, the Court applied
Section 7's prophylactic "incipiency" standard which requires the government only
26
to show that the merger "may be substantially likely to lessen competition.
Brown Shoe came to represent the epoch of the Populist period of antitrust law
in the United States where the Justice Department and the Supreme Court seemed
intent on protecting small business rather than the competitive process itself. The
Court there noted that the efficiencies and potential lower consumer prices that
could occur through vertical integration supported its finding of illegality because
27
of the harm it could cause to small retailers.
Seemingly speaking out of both sides of its mouth, the Court stated:
"[i]t is competition, not competitors which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
23

United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) [Supreme Court of the United
States] (Stewart, J., dissenting).

24

Brown Shoe. Both firms manufactured and distributed shoes as well, giving rise to a
vertical effects as well as horizontal merger analysis.

25

Id. at 343.

26

For a discussion of the incipiency doctrine see Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The FutureofAntitrust:
Ideology vs. Legislative Intent, 35 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 575, 586-87 (1990).

27

Brown Shoe, 323-34. Five years later the Court reaffirmed this view in FTC v. Proctor &

Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967) [Supreme Court of the United States] ("possible
economies cannot be used as a defence to illegality in section 7 merger cases.").

A Concise History of CorporateMergers and the Antitrust Laws in the United States
through the maintenance of viable, small, locally owned businesses.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It
resolved these competing considerations in favour of decentralization.""a
Apparently, defence counsel in the Brown Shoe case felt compelled to
argue, to counter the government's assertion that integration efficiencies were
anticompetitive, that the merger would produce no such economies or consumer
benefit. 29 Further, the Court concluded that the merger must be enjoined, even
though the combined firm would control only 7.2% of the nation's retail shoe stores
and only 2.3% of retail shoe outlets.31
Subsequently, in the PhiladelphiaNational Bank decision, the Supreme Court
seemed to provide a more definite standard for illegality g' There a proposed
consolidation of the second and third largest commercial banks in the Philadelphia
area would have resulted in a bank with about 36% of area banks' net assets and
would have increased the size of the largest two banks from about 44% to 59% of
the area's commercial banking business. In blocking the merger, the Court held
that an acquisition which produces a firm with "an undue percentage" of the relevant
32
market is presumptively illegal.
Of course, strong facts make for easy decisions. In subsequent decisions,
however, the Supreme Court made it clear that it was not constrained by the
presumptive illegality standard of PhiladelphiaNational Bank, as it continued to strike
down horizontal mergers with questionable anticompetitive impacts.33 Surely the

28
29

30
31
32
33

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344.
See Harlan Blake & Kenneth Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 422, 456-57 (1965). For additional criticisms of Brown Shoe, see,
e.g., John L. Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 JOURNAL OF LAW &ECONOMICS 81 (1975);
Thomas Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Law: Of Economics, Populism,and
Cynicism, 67 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 325 (1968); Robert Bork &Ward Bowman, The Crisis
inAntitrust, 65 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 363 (1965).
Brown Shoe, 294-95.
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) [Supreme Court of
the United States].
Id. at 363.
See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) [Supreme Court of
the United States]; United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) [Supreme
Court of the United States]; United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271
(1964) [Supreme Court of the United States] (Rome Cable).See also United States v. First
National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964) [Supreme Court of the
United States] (bank merger struck down under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
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of the Warren Court's merger decisions was the 1966 Von's Grocery case.34 In that
case, the Court barred a merger between the third and sixth largest grocery chains
in Los Angeles, even though the resulting market share of the merged company
was only 7.5%. The merger created the second largest grocery chain in a market
in which the largest firm had 8% of the market, and the four largest firms had a
39
combined 28.8% market share.
The majority was concerned about a perceived trend of mergers of grocery
chains and about a reduction of single store groceries. 6 It believed that it was
executing congressional intent to protect small businesses that might not survive
7
in markets dominated by large chains.
Justice Stewart wrote a blistering dissent, noting that the merger produced
a firm with only 1.4% of the grocery stores (although with 7.5% of the grocery
sales) and resulted in only a 1.1% market share increase of the two largest firms
and a 3.3% market increase of the six largest grocery retailers. 3 He also noted the
lack of connection between grocery chain acquisitions and the reduction of single
stores, expressing doubt as to whether Congress intended Section 7 "as a charter
to roll back the supermarket revolution," calling the majority opinion as "hardly more
39
than a requiemfor the so-called 'Mom and Pop' grocery stores.
Although the 1960's were considered the halcyon period for the Populist
merger enforcement that sought to protect the viability of small business, it turns
out that the government often gained only Pyrrhic victories. While the government
was winning on the law, it was frequently losing in the remedial stage of the cases,
often gaining deficient or no relief. 0
34
35
36
37

38
39

40

United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) [Supreme Court of the United
States] [Hereinafter, "Von's Grocery"].
Id. at 281 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 272-74.
Von's Grocery, 275-77. See also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 557 (2d ed., 2006).
Von's Grocery, 302. (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
Von's Grocery, 288. Justice Stewart also argued that nothing the Court could do could
resurrect Mom and Pop stores "run over by the automobile or obliteratedby the freeway."
See also Joshua Wright, Von's Grocery and the Concentration-PriceRelationship in Grocery
Retail, 49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 743, 746-47 (2001) (arguing that Von's Grocery is "no longer
capable of any intelligible contribution to antitrust doctrine.").
See Kenneth Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 JOURNAL OF LAW &
ECONOMIcs 43, 48 (1969) (survey showed of merger cases brought between 1950 and
1960 showed that federal enforcement agencies obtained no relief (21 cases) or deficient
relief (8 cases) in 29 or 39 cases).

A Concise History of CorporateMergers and the Antitrust Laws in the United States
For example, in 1959 the Department of Justice brought a suit challenging
the 1958 acquisition by Pabst, the nation's tenth largest brewer, of Blatz, which was
number eighteen. The government did not finally prevail until a 1966 Supreme
Court decision. 41 The Court remanded to the district court to find a buyer for what
remained of Blatz. But Blatz no longer existed as a separate entity and finding a buyer
for its brewing plant proved impossible. As a result, the district court dismissed the
complaint, resulting in the Department of Justice winning the substantive law battle
42
but losing the remedial war a full ten years after it had brought suit.
The government's aggressive merger enforcement of the 1950's, 1960's and
early 1970's was not limited to horizontal mergers. The enforcement agencies
brought a number of suits successfully challenging so-called conglomerate
acquisitions, which had the effect of expanding geographic or product markets
and thus, theoretically at least, harming potential competition or entrenching a
firm in a market.43 They also used Section 7 to attack joint ventures, 44 mergers with
46
vertical effects, 45 and mergers involving reciprocal purchasing arrangements.

41

United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) [Supreme Court of the United
States].

42

United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.Wis.1969) [District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin].

43

See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974) [Supreme Court
of the United States] (potential competition); United States v. Connecticut National
Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974) [Supreme Court of the United States] (potential competition);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) [Supreme Court of the United
States] (potential competition theory); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562
(1972) [Supreme Court of the United States] (potential competition & increased entry
barriers); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) [Supreme Court of the United
States] (entrenchment theory); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964) [Supreme Court of the United States] (potential competition); Yamaha Motors
Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8 th Cir. 1981) [United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit]
(potential competition); Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th
Cir. 1981) [United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit] (potential competition); BOC
International, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977) [United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit] (two theories of potential competition).

44

See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) [Supreme Court of the
United States]; Yamaha Motors Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981) [United States
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit].

45

See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) [Supreme Court of the United
States]; Brown Shoe.

46

See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1985) [Supreme Court of the United
States]; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970) [Supreme Court of the United States];
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
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On the substantive side, the tide began to significantly change with the
Supreme Court's 1974 GeneralDynamics decision. 47 As the Supreme Court shifted
from the Warren Court to the Burger Court, its make-up had changed significantly
in the eight years since the controversial Von's Grocery decision. This time Justice
Stewart found himself in the majority in a 5-4 decision to permit a merger between
48
two coal companies over a strong government challenge.
In General Dynamics, the Department of Justice had relied on market data
to assert that the acquisition would materially enlarge the market share of the
acquiring company in a market trending towards concentration. The Supreme
Court disagreed, finding that the high market share of the merged firm was an
inaccurate barometer of the likely competitive effects of the merger because the
acquired company lacked the necessary uncommitted coal reserves to continue
49
its current output level.
In spite of its new approach, future attempts to apply the General Dynamics
rationale to rebut market concentration data in other contexts proved largely
unsuccessful. 5 The decision, like most of the Warren Court decisions of the previous
51
two decades, failed to provide standards or guidelines for lower courts to follow.

47
48

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) [Supreme Court of the
United States].
See C. Paul Rogers III, Perspectiveson CorporateMergers and the Antitrust Laws, 12 LOYOLA
CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 301, 306-09 (1981) (describing how four new Justices
had joined the Supreme Court).
UNIVERSITY

49

415 U.S. 486, at 508.

50

See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) [United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit]; White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 781 F.2d 1124
(6th Cir. 1984) [United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit]; Kaiser Aluminium &
Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981) [United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit]; Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 ( 7 th Cir. 1981) [United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit]; United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978) [Supreme Court of the United States]. Cf. United States
v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) [United States Court of Appeal,
Second Circuit]; United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977)
[United States Court of Appeal Seventh Circuit].

51

See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, The Limited Casefor an Efficiency Defense in HorizontalMergers,
58 TULANE LAW REVIEW 503, 514 (1983); James Ponsoldt, The Expansion of Horizontal
Merger Defenses After General Dynamics: A Suggested Reconsideration of Sherman Act
Principles, 12 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 361 (1981); Howard R. Lurie,
Mergers Underthe Burger Court:An Anti-Antitrust Bias and Its Implications,23 VILLANOVA
LAW REVIEW 213 (1978).
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Nonetheless, the case is considered a watershed in U.S. merger jurisprudence
because of the Supreme Court's willingness to look beyond market concentration
2
measures to ascertain the likely competitive impact of consolidations.

V. THE

MERGER GUIDELINES AND PRE-MERGER
NOTIFICATION

The aggressive U.S. merger enforcement of the 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's
thus identified two critical shortcomings: (1) the lack of analytical rigor and thus
predictability in judicial opinions, and (2) the failure of adequate remedies where
an acquisition was found to violate the law. A step toward addressing the first
problem came with the issuance of the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines
in 1968.53 These first guidelines, as well as successive versions, were not binding
on the agency but were nonetheless designed to provide guidance to prospective
merging entities on how the agency would analyze mergers, and about which
acquisitions it would likely challenge.
Congress responded to the government's problems in obtaining adequate
relief in 1976 by passing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act which
in part mandates that parties contemplating a merger notify the government of their
intent before the merger is consummated.5 4 This premerger notification requirement
allows the enforcement agencies to investigate the likely competitive impact of
major acquisitions before they occur. Proposed mergers which are large enough
to require notification cannot be lawfully consummated until the requisite waiting
period has expired or the reviewing agency waives it.55 Where the investigating
agency determines that the proposed merger poses serious anticompetitive risks,

52

53
54
55

See C. Paul Rogers III, Stephen Calkins, Mark R. Patterson &William R. Andersen, supra
note 6, at 552; Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S Grimes, supra note 37, at 632; Miles
W. Kirkpatrick & Stephen Paul Mahinka, The Supreme Court and the "New Economic
Realism" of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL 821 (1976).
U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1968), reprintedin 4 TRADE REGULATION
REPORTER (CCH) 9113,101.
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title II,§ 201, 90
Stat. 1390 (1976). The Act added § 7A to the Clayton Act and is codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a.
The Act provides for a 30-day waiting period once the required premerger filings are
made. If, after an initial review, the investigative agency determines that the merger
may be anticompetitive it can issue a "second request" which requires much more
extensive information and documentation from the merging parties. Compliance
with a second request may take weeks or even months and significantly protracts the
merger review process.
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it can seek injunctive relief to preserve the targeted company as an independent
entity pending full judicial resolution of the case, thus avoiding the problem of
untangling an already merged firm.
It is not a stretch to say that the introduction of Merger Guidelines, the
General Dynamics decision, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act collectively ushered
in the modern era of merger enforcement in the United States. The Merger
Guidelines have evolved, with major revisions made in the 1982 edition in at
least partial response to the criticism that the Justice Department was ignoring
the 1968 Guidelines by failing to challenge mergers that those Guidelines
would have made presumptively illegal.56 The 1982 Guidelines introduced the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of the pre and post-market
concentration of the relevant market, replacing the 1968 Guidelines' focus on
the largest four firms in the market. Those Guidelines were revised in 1984 to
clarify that reliance on the HHI calculations was not the sole basis of analysis of
market concentration levels and stressing that qualitative analyses of markets
57
and competitors were still important.
In 1992 the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission for the
first time issued joint Guidelines. 58 These were in fact a revision of the 1984
Guidelines and were an attempt to eliminate ambiguities and reflect advances
in legal and economic thinking about the likely competitive impact of mergers.
Notably, the 1992 Guidelines were for the first time limited to horizontal
mergers, leaving conglomerate and vertical mergers to be governed under the
1984 Guidelines.
The next major Guidelines' revision occurred eighteen years later in 2010
to again reflect the agencies' present approaches and added sophistication in
evaluating proposed mergers. 59 Among many changes, the 2010 Guidelines
emphasize that identification of adverse competitive effects is the key and that
relevant market definition may or may not be the starting point of that analysis.
56
57
58
59

U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1982), reprintedin 4 TRADE REGULATION
REPORTER (CCH) § 13,102. See William Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's
View, 71 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 618 (1983).
U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1984), reprintedin 4 TRADE REGULATION
REPORTER (CCH) § 13,103.
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines (1992),
available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htim.
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines (2010),
available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines//hmg-2010.html (Last Accessed on
February 20, 2013).
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They also emphasize that merger analysis is fact specific and may call for a variety
of methodologies to ascertain likely competitive effects. The Guidelines provide
extended discussion of how the agencies evaluate unilateral competitive and
coordinated effects issues, and update the HHI concentration thresholds to reflect
current agency practice. They also reflect the agencies' evolving view of efficiencies
as a defence to an otherwise unlawful acquisition.60
The Guidelines are intended to enhance transparency, predictability
and thus litigation avoidance. U.S. antitrust lawyers are better able to counsel
prospective merger partners about the likelihood of a government challenge. The
enforcement agencies, however, have come under criticism for their refusal to
publish information about their enforcement decisions.6' That is, neither agency
routinely provides any explanation about decisions not to challenge a proposed
merger, even if they considered genuine competitive issues. Similarly, the agencies
typically do not disclose any information or analysis when a challenge results in
the abandonment of the merger or where a negotiated settlement is reached.62
This lack of transparency and openness not only reduces predictability but
can also mask under-or over-enforcement tendencies. Under-enforcement can be a
particular problem both in cases in which no action is taken and in cases ending in
consent decrees, in which typically only information about the remedy is disclosed.
It also makes enforcement errors more difficult to detect, and can unfortunately
help to mask political influence.63
The Guidelines' use of the HH, perhaps unintentionally, reflects a significant
shift from the agencies' earlier merger enforcement policy. For example, the HHI
60

The courts and enforcement agencies began recognizing efficiencies in the 1980s, see
e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, The Limited Casefor an Efficiency Defence in HorizontalMergers, 58
TULANE LAW REVIEW 503 (1983); Timothy Muris, The Efficiency Defence Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 30 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW 381 (1980); Oliver Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defence Revisited, 125 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
699 (1977). However, not until the 1992 version did the Guidelines specifically mention
efficiencies as a potential defence to a merger. The agencies revised the guidelines
in 1997 for the sole purpose of amending and clarifying when they would consider
efficiency gains in a merger and have continued to set forth their evolving thinking
about when efficiencies are relevant in a merger analysis. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 4 (2010). See also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

61
62
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56-60 (2007).

See, e.g., id., at 63-66.
See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51
LAW REVIEW 937 (2003).
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, supra note 37, at 605-06.
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thresholds show that the government would today not bother to challenge at
least three cases which it not only challenged but successfully litigated before the
Supreme Court in the 1960's.64
A related issue is whether the Guidelines generally and the HHJ
specifically have influenced substantive antitrust law. While courts have been
quick to claim their independence from the Guidelines, 65 they definitely have
had a substantive impact. For example, courts have held used the HHJ to
establish a prima facie case,6 6 a presumption of illegality,6 7 and as a basis for a
6
preliminary injunction.
The pre-merger notification program authorized in the 1976 Hart-ScottRodino Act has been a rousing success both as measured by its objective of
giving the federal enforcement agencies a meaningful opportunity to obtain
pre-merger injunctions and by the fact that at least seventy other jurisdictions,
including India, have adopted similar requirements. 69 Filings under the Act

64

The three cases are United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966) [Supreme Court
of the United States]; United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (Supreme
Court of the United States]; United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271
(1964) [Supreme Court of the United States] (Rome Cable). See C. Paul Rogers III, Stephen
Calkins, Mark R. Patterson & William R. Andersen, supra note 6, at 561-62.

65

See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) [United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit] ("Certainly the Guidelines are not binding on the courts..."); FTC
v. PPG Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit] ("Guidelines offer a useful illustration.., but are by
no means.., binding on the court."); United States v. Engelhard Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463,
1484 (M.D. Ga. 1997) ("The Merger Guidelines 5%-10% test is an inaccurate barometer
of cross-elasticity of demand as to the facts of this case."), af'd, 126 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th
Cir. 1997) [United States Court of Appeal Eleventh Circuit] (government did not meet
its burden of proof, making it unnecessary to address validity of 5%-10% test).

66

See, e.g., FTC v. Arch Coal Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004) [United States District
Court, District of Columbia] (HHI market concentration and increase enough for a
prima facie case, but "not an overwhelming statisticalcase.").
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See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit].

68

See, e.g., FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34,51 (D.D.C. 2002) [United States District
Court, District of Columbia].

69

See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 152. With the globalization
of markets, mergers involving transnational companies face pre-merger notification
requirements in multiple jurisdictions. For example, as early as 1989 the Gillette/
Wilkinson merger was notified in 14 separate jurisdictions. See OECD, MERGER CASES
IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PRACTICES

(1994). Of course, multiple

notification requirements delay consummation of the merger, and increase both the
costs and the uncertainty of approval. Jurisdictions may have differing competition
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have averaged about 1,000 annually with a high of 4,749 in 2000, although
recent increases in the filing thresholds have reduced the number of filings by
70
about 50 percent.
Pre-merger notification has, unexpectedly, shifted U.S. merger policy away
from the courts and into the hands of the enforcement agencies. Prior to the act, the
agencies frequently litigated merger cases, with a steady flow of cases reaching the
Supreme Court. For example, during 1974 and 1975 the Supreme Court rendered
decisions in four Section 7 cases 71 but in the almost 40 years since has not considered
a single merger case on the merits.
Although the proponents of the legislation apparently assumed that premerger notification would expedite but not necessarily lessen the number of cases
reaching the judicial system, 72 it has in fact significantly reduced the opportunities
for judicial review.7' Since the passage of the Act, many if not most merger cases
are settled or abandoned through largely confidential negotiations without judicial
opinions or records. In fiscal year 2006, for example, the government sought judicial

objectives and come to opposite conclusions about the likely competitive impact of
a proposed acquisition, as in the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger of 1997, see
Commission of the European Communities, The Commission Clears the Merger Between
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Under Certain Conditions and Obligations, 1997 O.J.
(L 336-8/12/1997) 16, and the 2001 General Electric/Honeywell merger, see General
Electric/Honeywell Case COMP/M.2220, Commission Decision of July 3, 2001. Major
jurisdictions like the European Community and the United States are, however,
increasingly engaging in cooperation agreements to provide each other earlier notice
about competitive concerns with the goal of reducing conflicting outcomes. See generally
C. Paul Rogers II, Cross-Border Mergers and Antitrust: Jurisdiction,Enforcement and
CooperationIssues, in Norbert Horn, ed., CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
AND THE LAW (2001).

70

See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION

71

See United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975) [Supreme
Court of the United States]; United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656
(1974) [Supreme Court of the United States]; United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S.
602 (1974) [Supreme Court of the United States]; United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) [Supreme Court of the United States].

72

See H. Rep. No. 94-1343, at 14 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-803, at 70 (1976).

73

Exceptions include FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit]; FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d
1045 (8th Cir. 1999) [United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit]; FTC v. Freeman
Hospital, 69 F.3d 260 (8 th Cir. 1995) [United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit];
United States v. Oracle Corporation, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) [United States
District Court, N.D. California]; FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.C.D.C.
2000) [United States District Court, District of Columbia]; FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 1066 (D.C.D.C. 1997) [United States District Court, District of Columbia].
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relief in 29 cases, or about 1.7% of proposed mergers for which there was a premerger filing.' Thus, in effect, the enforcement agencies are applying their merger
enforcement policies in most cases without judicial review.
Litigation is also reduced because the potential merging parties are more
strategically disadvantaged than previously when government challenges typically
came after the consummation of the merger. As noted, judicial aversion to divestiture
often meant that the government had no effective remedy even after winning on
the merits. 75 In contrast, litigants today face the same substantial litigation costs
knowing that the government, if successful, will obtain an injunction blocking the
merger. Again, fewer litigated cases mean more agency and less judicial influence
on merger policy. Further, fewer litigated cases reduce the number of cases available
for review by appellate courts, including of course the Supreme Court.
Under the merger review process, if the enforcement agency believes that the
proposed merger may have significant anticompetitive affects after a preliminary
review, it can ask for additional information and documents. The so-called "second
request" typically requires the production of millions of additional documents and
can extend the time for the merger review by six months or longer. 71 It requires the
expenditure of several additional million dollars for attorney's fees. One estimate
places the cost of complying with a second request at between $5 million and $10
million. 77 Although the enforcement agencies assert that they need the additional
time and volume of information to accurately assess the merger's likely competitive
impact, many are skeptical. 78
74

75

76
77

78

But, of course, in the great majority of filings the government found no competitive
concern and closed its investigation during the initial waiting period. See ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 156.
In one extreme case, the Department of Justice in 1960 challenged a 1955 acquisition
involving companies engaged in printing colour comic supplements. The trial court
finally dismissed the complaint in 1970, but in 1970 the Supreme Court held that the
acquisition violated Section 7 and ordered the trial court to fashion appropriate relief.
That court ordered divestiture in 1973, but by then no interested buyer could be found.
See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) [United
States District Court, Western District of New York] (dismissing complaint), rev;d, 402
U.S. 549 (1971) [United States Supreme Court], on remand to 1973 WL 833 (W.D.N.Y.)
[United States District Court, Western District of New York] (ordering divestiture).
THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 152.
Steven C. Sunshine &David. P. Wales, Statement at AMC Merger Enforcement Hearing,
at 4 (Nov. 17, 2005). The agencies do periodically attempt to reform merger review to
expedite the process, limit the scope of production, and in general reduce the burden
of compliance with a second request. See Federal Trade Commission, Reforms to the
Merger Review Process, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2006/mergerreviewprocess.pdf.
THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 152.
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The relative secrecy of the merger review process also reduces the
transparency hoped for from the pre-merger notification requirement and enhances
the agencies' effective control over merger policy. The absence of merger review
records or analysis further hinders scholarly and external review and assessment
of the government's merger enforcement and may allow an agency to pursue a
policy at odds with judicial or mainstream antitrust thinking. For example, a 1989
American Bar Association antitrust task force accused the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice with not following its own merger guidelines in making
79
enforcement decisions.

VI.

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

An additional, perhaps unintentional, consequence of pre-merger notification
is that it has reduced private enforcement of Section 7. Unlike the Indian Competition
Act, private parties in the U.S. may sue for treble damages and injunctive relief,
including divestiture, 0 under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.8' Although the
number of all private antitrust suits was small prior to World War II, their numbers
grew commensurately with the Populist expansion of antitrust law in the post-War
era to a peak of 1,400 private complaints in 1978.82
Initially, at least, the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act appears to have had
little effect on the number of private Section 7 enforcement actions. An American
Bar Association task force reported that 144 private Section 7 actions were brought
between 1977 and 1988, and that, from 1981 to 1986, there were as many private
as government challenges to mergers. 3
Beginning in the late 1970's, however, the Supreme Court seemingly raised
the bar for private plaintiffs to establish antitrust standing and injury, issues not
typically borne by the government. Thus, in the merger context, rivals of the
merging parties do not have standing to sue, unless they allege a competitive injury
79

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW TASK FORCE ON

THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) [Supreme Court of the United
States].
15 U.S.C.A. § 15; 15 U.S.C.A. § 26.
See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction
and Framework, in PRIVATE
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26-30 (1989).

ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING

White ed., 1988).
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: LAW AND POLICY 9,

No. 16, PRIVATE LITIGATION
11, 118-26 (1988).
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to the market as a whole rather than just to them as a competitor. 4 The Court also
made it more difficult for private plaintiffs to survive summary judgment s5 and,
more recently, to survive a motion to dismiss on the pleadings. 6
In addition to more demanding procedural hurdles, however, pre-merger
notification provides additional disincentives for private enforcement. The cost
of a private enforcement effort is substantial and the statistical risk of failure is
great. Further, private litigants do not have pre-suit access to discovery, as does
the government. That means they must file suit first to be able to gain information
from the merging parties.
Post-merger lawsuits, like pre-Hart-Scott-Rodino government actions, face
problems of securing an adequate remedy even if the plaintiff is successful on the
merits. Courts are even more reluctant to grant divestiture today 7 and, further,
a private litigant faces an uphill battle to prove money damages since it must
establish causation between the unlawful merger and its loss of revenue or profits.SS
84

85

See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) [Supreme Court
of the United States]; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977) [Supreme Court of the United States]; Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) [United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit]; Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1989) [United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit]; Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981) [United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit]; Atlantic
Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2003)
[United States District Court, District of Columbia]. See also Joseph Brodley, Antitrust
Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement
Goals, 94 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1 (1995).
See, e.g. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) [Supreme

Court of the United States]; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752
(1984) [Supreme Court of the United States]; Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp.
of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) [United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit]. Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) [United States Supreme Court]. See also Stephen Calkins,
Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of EquilibratingTendencies
in the Antitrust System, 74 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1065 (1986); C. Paul Rogers III,
Summary Judgmentsin Antitrust ConspiracyLitigation, 10 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LAW JOURNAL 667 (1979).
86

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) [Supreme Court of the United
States] (overruling previous "no set of facts" standard for pleading).

87

See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) [United
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia].
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) [Supreme Court
of the United States]; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 12324 (1969) [Supreme Court of the United States]; Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.

88

327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) [Supreme Court of the United States]; Story Parchment Co.
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As a result, the plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers are less likely to take a private merger
enforcement action on a typical contingent fee basis, leaving the private plaintiff
to foot the cost of litigation entirely.89
In addition, it is easy to speculate that private plaintiffs may be less likely to
persuade a court to enjoin, never mind award damages that would be automatically
trebled, an acquisition that enforcement agencies chose not to challenge.
Mandatory pre-merger notification means that federal enforcement agencies
will be closely reviewing proposed mergers which meet Hart-Scott-Rodino size
thresholds. As a result, a private party opposing a merger is much more likely to
devote resources urging that the enforcement agency oppose the merger and, if
it does, supporting that effort. In fact, a private party may get two or more bites
at the apple since it can weigh in against a proposed merger at each stage of the
government's review and potential enforcement action.
Private merger enforcement could still, theoretically at least, be an effective
enforcement mechanism, particularly for mergers that do not meet the pre-merger
notification thresholds in smaller but still oligopolistic markets. 90 As the agencies
have periodically adjusted the financial thresholds for mandatory pre-merger filing
upward, the number of filings has declined, perhaps increasing the importance

v. Paterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1931) [Supreme Court of the United
States]; Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 664 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1981) [United States
Court of Appeal, Ninth Circuit] (target of unfriendly takeover unable to establish that
market decline had any connection to threatened takeover).
89

See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, supranote 6, at 387. Contingent fee agreements usually provide
that the successful plaintiff's lawyer would receive a percentage, normally 33 to 40%, of
a treble damage award plus costs expended. Thus, in a situation in which the plaintiff
is bereft of resources, the contingent fee lawyer finances the litigation in the hopes
of a large fee through settlement or a successful verdict on the merits, followed by a
large damages award.

90

As noted, the Supreme Court has even held that divestiture is a remedy theoretically
available to private litigants. See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990)
[Supreme Court of the United States]. See also Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229
(8 h Cir. 2010) [United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit]; Lucas Automotive
Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228 (9 h Cir. 1998) [United
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit]; Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653
F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987) [United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania]. Since
divestiture is equitable relief, private litigants may also face potential equitable defences
such as laches and "unclean hands" which typically cannot be raised against the
government. See, e.g., Arthur L. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.F. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413
(6 h Cir. 1990) [United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit].
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of private enforcement in non-mandatory filing mergers.9' Further, even since
passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, private suits have occasionally halted very
substantial (and presumably anticompetitive) mergers.9 2 As recently as 1999, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed that private enforcement is integral
to the congressional mandate to protect competition and that the failure of the
government to object to a merger does not establish its legality.93 Thus, in spite of
the obstacles and disincentives described above, private parties do sometimes bring
94
Section 7 enforcement actions. The great majority, however, are unsuccessful.
VII. CONCLUSION
U.S. merger law has, not surprisingly given its 122 year history, changed
dramatically both procedurally and substantively. In recent years, economic
learning has advanced while U.S. antitrust policy has become more focused on
consumer welfare and efficiencies as goals. The understanding of what signals
likely competitive harm has evolved, and as a result cases that the government
litigated all the way to the Supreme Court forty years ago would go unchallenged
today.
Pre-merger notification and the Merger Guidelines have ushered in modern
merger enforcement policy in the United States. Collectively they have had the
effect of reducing the judiciary's role in merger enforcement while enhancing that of
the enforcement agencies. As a result, enforcement policy is squarely in the hands
of the government regulators. The Guidelines are in fact substantive and although
not binding on the courts, are certainly influential. Further, since the government
brings rather few cases to the judicial system, but disposes of most cases in the

91

92
93
94

Of course, there is nothing to prevent the enforcement agencies from challenging a
merger not meeting the mandatory filing thresholds or of private parties affected from
urging the government to take action in those instances.
See, e.g., Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981) [United States Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit]; Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1981) [United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit].
See Allied Signal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 575 ( 7 th Cir. 1999) [United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit].
See, e.g., Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1129 (81h Cir. 2010) [United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit]; Malaney v. UAL Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106049 (N.D.
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merger review process, the agencies' influence over substantive merger law has
effectively increased dramatically.
By the same token, the merger review process has had salutary procedural
impacts, providing the government with meaningful access, oversight, and premerger injunctive relief. The Guidelines do in fact provide the business community
with guidance about when the enforcement agencies are likely to challenge
consolidations. This information is designed to and has increased predictability
and certainty into the merger process. Thus, the U.S. merger system of review and
challenge, while subject to ongoing criticism for a lack of transparency and while
far from static, has improved demonstrably in the last 30 years.
India, in its nascent stage of merger review and enforcement, must of course
develop its own merger enforcement processes, priorities, and goals specific to
its growing economy in an increasingly borderless commercial world. It certainly
can and perhaps should be informed by the development of merger policy in the
United States and other "mature" competition jurisdictions, both for replication
where appropriate and for mistake avoidance. With its long history, U.S. merger
law provides plenty of fodder for both.

